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INTRODUCTION
Much attention has rightly been devoted to European Com-
munity ("Community" or "EC") and U.S. antitrust and an-
tidumping policies, and to international issues such as the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").' The European
Commission's state aid rules are less well known, and interna-
tional comparisons are impossible. The Commission has the ex-
clusive responsibility to exercise a priori control over state aid
granted by EC Member States in order to prevent undue distor-
tions of competition. The Commission may order recovery of
aid and secure compensation for the distortive effect of the aid
that it is prepared to allow. These are responsibilities with major
political, economic, and legal implications.
* Director General, Directorate General for Competition, Commission of the Eu-
ropean Communities. Member of the Editorial Advisory Board of the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal. A version of this Article will be published in 1994 FoRDHAM CoRP. L.
INST. (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1995). Copyright © Transnational Publications, Inc., 1995.
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
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Since 1983, there have been many changes. The Commis-
sion has devoted significant attention to state aid questions in
the public sector, while the Community's courts have developed
the scope ofjudicial review of state aid decisions. Before consid-
ering these and other matters in more detail, this Article will
examine some of the defining moments in the evolution of state
aid policy.
It must be recalled that the Commission has been, and to a
large extent still is, alone in the state aid field. There are no
models and no precedents, there is little academic debate, and
the contrast with antitrust is remarkable. The Commission has
had to find its way, often in times of economic crisis, towards the
definition of a policy founded on a set of rather general rules
addressed to Member States that limit their power to spend their
(taxpayers') money as they wish. This was an enormous chal-
lenge, and the Author's predecessors in the Directorate General
of Competition ("DG IV") deserve great credit for the establish-
ment of a coherent and credible policy in such difficult circum-
stances.
Part I of this Article describes the historical development of
state aid in the European Community. Part II examines "public
enterprises" and the need for transparency of state aid. Part III
considers the future of regulating state aid in light of the Euro-
pean Economic Area ("EEA") and the Europe Agreements con-
cluded with the Central and East European Countries. Part IV
proposes procedural guidelines with respect to the European
Court ofJustice, as well as the Commission's proposal of Council
legislation under Article 94 of the Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Community ("EC Treaty") .2
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC") Treaty
2. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 94, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R- 573, 631-32 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made 17 Treaty on
European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.LIR 719, 31 I.L.M.
247 (1992) [hereinafter TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I) [hereinafter EEC Treaty], amended by Single European Act, O.J. L
169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.IR 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TRIEAnEs ESTABUSHING THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNrriEs (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987).
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sets out a strict ban on state aids in its Article 4(c).3 The original
conception of the authors of the Treaty seems to have been that
ECSC aid would replace national assistance to the coal and steel
industries. This proved unrealistic, and interventionist industrial
policies were followed, with both national and Community funds
used to that end.4 The letter to Member States of April 19775
and the "Davignon plan"6 in November 1977 set out principles
linking aid to the restructuring of the European steel industry
sector in deep crisis. In ECSC matters, the Council plays an im-
portant role.
The rules of the EC Treaty are fundamentally different.
The prohibition of state aid that distorts competition is neither
absolute nor unconditional. To start with, only aid that affects
trade between Member States comes under Article 92(1).8 Cer-
tain kinds of aid must be authorized if the aid meets certain con-
ditions.9 Under Article 92(3), the Commission has discretion to
3. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, art. 4(c), Apr. 18,
1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140, as amended in TRIrms ES rABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
TIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987) [hereinafter ECSC Treaty]. The article prohibits, as
incompatible with the common market, "subsidies or state assistance, or special charges
imposed by the State, in any form whatsoever." Id.
4. Id. art. 54.
5. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SEvENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY 1 261 (1978).
6. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, ELEVENTH GENERAL REPORT ON
THE Aarrvrrms OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNmES 148 et seq. (1977).
7. ECSC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 95.
8. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 92(1).
Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a member-
State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the pro-
duction of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between member-
States, be incompatible with the common market.
Id.
9. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 92(2).
The following shall be compatible with the common market:
(a) aid having a social character, granted to individual consumers, pro-
vided that such aid is granted without discrimination related to the
origin of the products concerned;
(b) aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or excep-
tional occurrences;
(c) aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic
of Germany affected by the division of Germany, in so far as such aid
is required in order to compensate for the economic disadvantages
caused by that division.
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authorize state aid measures and to make the necessary eco-
nomic analyses.1 °
Some problems are common to both Treaties. Neither con-
tains a definition of aid ("in any form whatsoever," as in the
ECSC Treaty)," and this remains a difficult issue. It is clear what
does not constitute aid: a general measure applicable to all
firms in a Member State or an investment made by a state body
in a company in circumstances in which a private investor would
have done likewise. It is also clear that the "state" includes all
levels and emanations of public authority.
In the Community, the Council has played a limited role in
the development of state aid policy. Recourse to Article 9412 as
the legal basis for legislation was considered a failure in the
10. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 92(3). Article 92(3) of the original EEC Treaty
provided:
The following may be considered to be compatible with the common market:
(a) aid to promote the economic development of area where the stan-
dard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious underem-
ployment;
(b) aid to promote the execution of an important project of common
European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy
of a Member State;
(c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of
certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trad-
ing conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest. How-
ever, the aids granted to shipbuilding as of 1 January 1957 shall, in so
far as they serve only to compensate for the absence of customs pro-
tection, be progressively reduced under the same conditions as apply
to the elimination of customs duties, subject to the provisions of this
Treaty concerning common commercial policy towards third coun-
tries;
(d) such other categories of aid as may be specified by decision of the
Council acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Com-
mission.
EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 92(3). After the TEU, Article 92(3) (d) became Article
92(3) (e), and the new Article 92(3) (d) reads, "aid to promote culture and heritage
conservation where such aid does not affect trading conditions and competition in the
Community to an extent that is contrary to the common interest." EC Treaty, supra
note 2, art. 92(3)(d).
11. ECSC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 4(c).
12. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 94.
The Council may, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the
Commission, make any appropriate regulations for the application of Articles
92 and 93 and may in particular determine the conditions in which Article
93(3) shall apply and the categories of aid exempted from this procedure.
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1960's13 and is now viewed as a Pandora's Box too dangerous to
open. In 1990, the Italian Government tried to provoke Council
discussion of state aid policy under Article 94.14 This was re-
sisted by the Commission, which feared an attack on its rigorous
approach, as well as a fruitless attempt to find a consensus
among the Member States in the Council. The Commission
agreed instead to present the annual Competition Report to the
Council, to hold regular meetings with the Member States to dis-
cuss state aid issues (known as "multilaterals"), and to increase
the transparency of its work by publishing a compendium of
texts.1
Therefore, there are no procedural regulations and no
block exemptions. The Commission has gradually developed
policy through cases, general policy frameworks, and notices.
Procedural rules have been established by case law drawing on
general principles.
The first decade of the European Community witnessed a
slow start in policy development. There were no general guide-
lines and no real debate was engaged with the Member States.
Protective measures (customs duties) still existed, but were pro-
gressively abolished under an accelerated timetable leading to
the establishment of a true customs union in July 1968. The
political difficulties of the mid-1960s slowed progress in this
area. The "empty French chair" crisis,"7 finally solved by the so-
called Luxembourg Compromise, 18 hindered the Community's
decision-making affairs, and undermined the Commission's self-
confidence for many years.
Against this background, it is noteworthy that only two EEC
and three ECSC aid cases were brought before the Court of Jus-
13. Proposition d'un Reglement du Conseil, COM (66) 95 Final (Mar. 1966), modi-
fied by Modifications a la Proposition d'un Reglement du Conseil, COM (66) 457 (Nov.
1966) (withdrawn in 1975); Proposition d'un Reglement du Conseil, COM (72) 1523
Final (Dec. 1972) (withdrawn in 1976).
14. Council of the European Communities, General Secretariat, Press Release No.
9139/90 (Presse 150), Nov. 1, 1990 (discussing meeting of Council of Industry Minis-
ters in Luxembourg, Oct. 15, 1990).
15. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXTH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLIC 127-28, 1 170 (1991).
16. Id.
17. B:2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw B10120/2, I B10-336
(describing French boycott of Community institutions and Luxembourg Compromise).
18. Id.; Extraordinary Session of the Council, 9 E.C. Buu.., no. 3, at 8 (1976); see
J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE LJ. 2403, 2423 (1991).
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tice before 1970. Some sectors of the economy had special treat-
ment in the Treaty. State aid policy in the agricultural sector
was, and remains, shaped by the common agricultural policy and
its successes, crises, and reforms. The transport sector also has a
common policy with special provisions in the Treaty. The first
Council decision in this area dates from May 1965 (inland trans-
port),19 and numerous regulations have been adopted since, in-
cluding an exemption from the obligation to notify certain aid
measures under Article 93(3)." ° Consideration of the special
features of the shipbuilding sector, where competition takes
place in an open, worldwide market with widespread subsidies,
was also necessary. The Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development ("OECD") has played a central role in
establishing a discipline over subsidy schemes. The first Council
Directive in this field was adopted in 1969, on the basis of a
Commission proposal of 1965, where aid ceilings were set corre-
sponding to the harm suffered by Community shipyards in the
world market.2 1
An important turning point transpired in 1971 when re-
gional policy developments compelled the Commission to estab-
lish a framework for a coordinated solution to the problem of
regions outbidding each other to secure mobile investment, at-
tracted by the growing success of what was then called the "com-
mon market."22 These issues took on greater urgency and scope
as the Community expanded in 1973. This was reflected in the
creation of the European Regional Development Fund
("ERDF") at the Paris European Summit in December 1974.3
The first sectoral framework in the textile industry was es-
19. Council Decision No. 65/271/EEC, OJ. 88/67 (1965).
20. Council Regulation No. 1191/69/EEC, J.O. L 156/1 (1969), OJ. Eng. Spec.
Ed. 1969, at 276; see EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 93(3).
The Commission shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its
comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. If it considers that any such plan
is not compatible with the common market having regard to Article 92, it shall
without delay initiate the procedure provided for in paragraph 2. The Mem-
ber State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until this
procedure has resulted in a final decision.
Id.
21. Council Directive No. 69/262, OJ. L 206/25 (1969).
22. See Commission Communication of 23June 1971, followed by Council Resolu-
tion of 20 October 1971, OJ. L 111 (1971).
23. Council Regulation No. 724/75, Oj. L 73/1 (1975).
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tablished inJuly 1971.24 The origin of this initiative-was the crisis
caused by slow adjustment to technological change, slow growth
of domestic demand, and cheap imports from developing coun-
tries. The approach followed resembled the one adopted re-
garding regional aid schemes: coordination with Member States
to avoid escalation of aid from countries seeking to protect their
own industries, leading to "beggar thy neighbor" spirals.
Legislation was usually eschewed in favor of "soft law" in the
form of Commission communications setting out disciplines co-
ordinated with the Member States.
The oil shocks of the 1970's gave rise to a vogue for indus-
trial policy of sectoral interventionism in favor of "national" or at
best "Community" champions; civil servants would pick indus-
trial winners. A high point was the 1972 Commission memoran-
dum to the Council on the "industrial and technology policy
measures to be adopted in the aircraft production industry."25
This was unashamedly dirigiste,26 including an exception to the
ban on export aid (the most heinous state aid offense).
The synthetic fibers code dates from 1977,27 and was fol-
lowed by a new textile communication to Member States in
197728 and a sectoral aid communication in May 1978.2' The
steel code was adopted in 1980 by means of a Commission deci-
sion after unanimous assent of the Council.30
These texts all sought to deal with the phenomenon of state
aid as a matter to be judged by reference to the Community in-
terest, for coordination, containment, and harmonization. They
are more an exercise in damage limitation than an expression of
policy driving for a reduction of aid and the attainment of the
Treaty's "system of undistorted competition."
The competitiveness of European firms in international
markets was a constant concern. The Commission's enforce-
24. Communication to Member States, SEC (71) 363 Final (July 1971).
25. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FiRsr REPORT ON COMPETITION
PoLicy 138-39, 11 176-78 (1971).
26. Dirigiste is a French term referring to a government-controlled economy.
27. Commission letter to Member States, SG (77) D/7633 (July 1977).
28. Commission Letter to Member States, SG (77) D/1190 (Feb. 1977), and An-
nex, SEC (77) 317 (Jan. 1977).
29. Communication to the Council on Commission Policy on Sectoral Aid
Schemes, COM (78) 221 Final (May 1978).
30. Commission Decision No. 257/80/ECSC, O.J. L 29/5 (1980) (establishing
Community rules for specific aids to steel industry).
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ment focus was mainly on regional and sectoral aid (e.g., invest-
ment, restructuring) to boost economic recovery. The 1975 and
1977 competition reports specifically featured aid for employ-
ment.3' It is only in 1994, several economic cycles later, that the
Commission is contemplating issuing guidelines on this issue.
In 1972, the Commission introduced a system of scrutiny for
general investment schemes through individual notifications
3 2
due- to difficulties experienced in assessing the regional or
sectoral impact of such schemes. These thresholds were raised
in 1979.33
The 1980's began with new, firm policy intentions. The
Commission's Philip Morris decision in 1979, prohibiting aid by
the Dutch government to the U.S. tobacco company, was a wa-
tershed.3 4 In 1980, the Court of Justice followed with its judg-
ment on appeal.3 5 Due to three years of recession, it was not
until 1983 that the effects of the new policy became apparent.
Better and more systematic use of the procedures provided for
in the Treaty improved the scrutiny of state aid. Substantive re-
forms, such as the reduction of thresholds and the elimination
of certain types of aid, followed in 1989 and the early 19901s. 6
The general political climate turned in favor of a rigorous
state aid policy in the 1980's. The role of the state in the econ-
omy was questioned closely. An increase in enforcement is re-
flected in the number of cases before the Court ofJustice, which
rendered sixty-two state aid judgments in the 1980's, as opposed
to twenty-two in the 1970's. The Commission began to use the
Article 93(2) procedure more systematically, encouraged by the
31. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIFTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
POuCY 95-99, [1 137-47 (1976); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SEVENTH
REPORT ON COMPETITION PoucY 165, 11 233-41 (1978).
32. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SECOND REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION Poucy 101-05, 1 116-21 (1973); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
THID REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 94 11 112 et seq. (1974); COMMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FOURTH REPORT ON COMPETITION PouCY 96, 11 166 et seq.
(1975).
33. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, NINTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
PoucY 111, 1 184 (1980).
34. Commission Decision No. 79/743/EEC, o.J. L 217/17 (1979) (Netherlands
government aid to Philip Morris).
35. Philip Morris Holland B.V. v. Commission, Case 730/79, [1980] E.C.R. 2671,
[1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 321.
36. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXTH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 128, 1 171 (1991).
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Intermills judgment in 1984.17
The Commission insisted on compliance with the notifica-
tion procedure3 and began to require recovery of incompatible
aid in 1983, even though the Court had spoken of abolition and
alteration of aid in 1973.11 It took ten years for the Commission
to send a letter to the Member States announcing a systematic
recovery obligation4 ° and implementation of a procedure clearly
provided for in the EC Treaty since the outset.
Progress was made in the 1980's on the public enterprises
front. The environment was also emerging as an important is-
sue. In October 1972, the Community adopted the "polluter
pays" principle, and the First Action Programme for the Environ-
ment followed in July 1973.41 In November 1974, the first guide-
lines on environmental aid were issued.4 2 Protection of the envi-
ronment as a Community policy objective did not come about
until the Single European Act,4 and the guidelines were not
amended, except for aid threshold reductions, until December
1993.44
In the area of research and development ("R&D"), interest
in the 1970's arose mainly via consideration of the problems of
the aircraft industry. In general, there was relatively little inter-
est in this issue until the early 1980's with a survey of existing
measures in the Member States, most of which had never been
examined.4' A framework was adopted in 1985.46
The first comprehensive survey on state aid in all Member
States was published in 1989.4' This marked a major turning
37. SA Intermills v. Commission, Case 323/82, [1984] E.C.R. 3809, [1983-1985
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 15,876.
38. See Commission Letter to Member States, SG (81) 12740 (Oct. 1981).
39. Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case 70/72, [1973] E.C.R. 813,
[1973] C.M.L.R. 741.
40. Commission Communication, O.J. C 318/3 (1983).
41. Declaration of the Council of the European Communities and of the Repre-
sentatives of the Governments of the Member States Meeting in the Council of 22 No-
vember 1973 on the Programme of Action of the European Communities on the Envi-
ronment, O.J. C 112/1 (1973).
42. Commission Letter to Member States, S/74/30.807 (Nov. 1974), and Annex I.
43. SEA, supra note 2.
44. Commission Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection, OJ. C 72/
3 (1994).
45. Community Framework for State Aids for Research and Development, O.J. C
83/2 (1986).
46. Id.
47. See European Commission, First Survey on State Aid in the European Commu-
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point. The survey raised many basic issues that had not yet been
resolved. What, for example, was state aid? What were general
social measures to which Article 101 might apply? The survey
revealed to the general public the overall high levels of aid. The
questions then asked about the usefulness of this expenditure
provided a strong basis for a more aggressive policy to reduce
aid. Existing general investment aid schemes were reviewed and
abolished by 1993.
All Member States view their motor vehicle industries as im-
portant components of their economies in terms of production,
the creation of income and employment, and external trade.
They have therefore been willing to grant aid to attract invest-
ment, or to keep plants in operation, with all the attendant dan-
gers of competitive bidding spirals. Where there were serious
threats of bankruptcy, rescue aid was provided generously. Such
aid started on a large scale after the first oil crisis in 1975. Esti-
mates of the amount of aid given to the industry from 1981 to
1986 are approximately eleven billion ECU.
The Commission was hampered in trying to control and
possibly reduce such aid. Regional aid was usually given under
approved schemes, so the Commission received no notification.
The same was true of R&D aid, which was given frequently for
normal model renewals. The introduction of the R&D frame-
work in 1986, which required notification of individual cases
above a threshold of twenty million ECU, helped matters. How-
ever, notifications of rescue and restructuring aid were fre-
quently late or were simply not made at all. In addition, public
sector companies could obtain additional advantages by receiv-
ing opaque aid in the form of preferential loans and state guar-
antees. This partial and limited control was seen as insufficient
in a sector characterized by intense competition and price sensi-
tivity. The Commission saw a need for a comprehensive set of
rules, and in the late 1980's began to develop a stricter and more
consistent approach towards rescue and restructuring aids in a
series of cases. 48
The set of rules was contained in a framework adopted in
nity, ISBN 92-825-9531/39; COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EIGHTEENTH
REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 143-44, 11 162-63 (1989).
48. E.g., Commission Decision No. 88/454/EEC, OJ. L 220/30 (1988) (French
government aid to Renault); Commission Decision No. 89/661/EEC, O.J. L 394/9
(1989), [1990] 1 CEC (CCH) 2024 (Italian government aid to Alfa Romeo).
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1989.49 It provided the means for comprehensive control of all
state aid to the motor vehicle sector, with substantive rules to
guide the Commission's assessment. Transparency and clarity
were major objectives of the framework, as was the enforcement
of a stricter discipline on aid to this sector, based on previous
experience. There is no question, however, of any attempt to
impose an industrial policy strategy on the sector.
The general concept behind the assessment of all cases is
that aid should always be in proportion to the problems it seeks
to resolve. The framework itself spells out the criteria for the
different types of aid in more detail.5" In application of the cri-
teria for regional aid, DG IV has developed a specific methodol-
ogy that is based on a comparative cost-benefit analysis of the
regional handicaps faced by an investor in an assisted area. A
detailed technical analysis of individual cases is carried out in
order to distinguish between basic research and applied re-
search and development, and to distinguish these from normal
modernization.
State aid policy toward small and medium-sized enterprises
("SMEs") had been outlined in the Sixth Report.5' Full guide-
lines followed much later in 1992,52 together with quicker proce-
dures for processing of notifications5" and a de minimis rule that
removed the notification obligation for aid of minor impor-
tance.54 This measure caused controversy because of its institu-
tion by Commission notice, rather than Council legislation pur-
suant to Article 94.
A constant feature of the challenges faced by state aid policy
has been pressure on Governments to give aid and on the Com-
mission to accept them whenever there is a recession.55
49. Community Framework on State Aid to the Motor Vehicle Industry, OJ. C
123/3 (1989).
50. Id.
51. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SixTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
PoLIcY 131, 1 253 (1977) (using broader definition of SMEs than present definition).
52. Community Guidelines on State Aid for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
(SMEs), o.J. C 213/2 (1992).
53. Id. 1 3.2, OJ. C 213/2, at 5 (1992).
54. Id. 1 3.2, OJ. C 213/2, at 4 (1992).
55. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TENTH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 111-58, 11 158 et seq. (1981); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
ELEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 111-54,11 175 et seq. (1982); COMMISSION OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TWELFTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 109-54, 11 158
et seq. (1982).
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What does the future hold? Employment aid guidelines will
be issued soon, as will a communication on short-term export
credit insurance. A guide to procedures will be published and
the European courts will no doubt continue to refine procedural
requirements. A general horizontal, non-sectoral framework,
taking into account competition problems arising from aid for
capital-intensive investments, would be welcome. However, the
establishment of guidelines is made increasingly difficult by in-
ternational concerns. On the one hand, the impact of GATT/
WTO and other international rules must be considered. On the
other hand, the risk of delocalization is of great concern, as
other industrialized or rapidly industrializing nations move to at-
tract mobile investment.
Calls are heard for consolidation and simplification of some
of the Commission's rules. The increased openness of the EC
system will attract the interest of public authorities and compa-
nies keen to turn the rules to their advantage. Lawyers, never
the most shy followers of regulatory trends, will keep all parties
on their toes.
There is more and more talk of "fairness" in this field. Is it
fair to export unemployment from one place to another? There
is also much more awareness of the amounts of money wasted on
delaying inevitable economic adjustments. The pursuit of coher-
ence between state aid and other Community policies is a major
preoccupation. Here, two trends are perceptible. First, state aid
policy is becoming more competition-oriented; second, other
Community objectives are more clearly defined as a result of the
successive amendments to the founding Treaties and enhanced
management by objectives in the Commission. The privatization
wave will help transparency and improve the efficiency of the
firms concerned, thus reducing their appetite for aid.
The convergence requirements laid down in the Treaty on
European Union for the transition to an Economic and Mone-
tary Union impose budgetary constraints and disciplines on the
Member States, making them think long and hard about spend-
ing priorities and the role of the state in the economy. Should
Governments spend on welfare and education, or on airlines,
steel, and shipbuilding companies? One does not have to be a
political scientist to guess most voters' answers to that question.
1994]
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II. PUBLTC ENTERPRJSES
What has been seen as a "public turn" and a "dramatic shift
in the system's substantive focus"56 at the end of the 1980's and
beginning of the 1990's has not been, in the field of state aid, as
brutal as it may appear. The concerns of the Commission about
competition between private and public sectors and opaque
flows of state aid are not new. It was necessary to achieve trans-
parency before any action could be taken. The greater visibility
and confidence of competition policy from the mid-eighties on-
wards, and the first directives on public service monopolies, led
to greater awareness in industry of the "public" aspects of com-
petition policy.
There had been a slow start in the early 1970's. At the Par-
liament's request, a study of distortions of competition between
public and private enterprises5 7 showed many gaps in the Com-
munity's knowledge. The data were simply not available. In
1975, complaints and written questions by Members of the Euro-
pean Parliament and acknowledgement that there was a lack of
transparency in the financial relationships between Member
States and their public enterprises hampered the Commission's
work. The Commission therefore announced the preparation of
a directive based on Article 90(3).- 8 This provision, which had
been present in the Treaty since 1958, had been neglected,
which was of interest to academic lawyers who tended to find its
interpretation a difficult challenge.
In 1979, during consultation on the steel code, the Council,
the ECSC Consultative Committee, and the European Parlia-
ment expressed concern about possible discrimination between
public and private firms. 9 The political climate was changing,
as the Reagan-Thatcher era began. Little did anyone know that
in the EC Treaty lay Sleeping Beauty (in the shape of Article 90)
awaiting her political and judicial princes!
56. DavidJ. Gerber, The Transformation of European Community Competition Law?, 35
HARv. INT'L LJ. 97, 137 (1994).
57. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SECOND REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION PoUCY 111, 11 127 etseq. (1973).
58. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIFTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
PoLIcY 105, 1 159 (1976).
59. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, NINTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY 103, 1 169 (1980).
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At the heart of Article 90 is the neutrality principle.6 0 Com-
petition rules must apply with the same rigor to private and pub-
lic enterprises, subject to the public service limitations of Article
90(2). The same rules, however, cannot apply in the same way if
the situation is not as transparent for public enterprises as it is
for private firms. In 1980, the transparency directive was
adopted"' and annulment proceedings brought by several Mem-
ber States were dismissed by the Court ofJustice.6 2 In 1984, the
Commission issued a Communication to Member States on the
participation of public authorities in the capital ownership of en-
terprises.63 This enshrined the private investor principle,
though it already had been featured in the preambles of the
1981 Steel Code' and the Council Directive on shipbuilding.65
The Commission was not alone in developing this principle.
The Council and Parliament also endorsed the principle in the
context of the steel code (the Council gave unanimous assent to
the Commission's proposal for aid to Finsider/lva) 66 and the
shipbuilding directives. In the 1980's, the Court of Justice up-
held a series of important decisions applying the private investor
principle in particular cases.67 There were numerous decisions
in which the Commission applied the principle. 8
60. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 90.
61. Commission Directive No. 80/723/EEC, OJ. L 195/35 (1980) (amended by
Commission Directive No. 85/413/EEC, OJ. L 229/20 (1985), which added previously
excluded sectors).
62. France, Italy & UK v. Commission, Joined Cases 188-90/80, [1982] E.C.R.
2545, [1982] C.M.L.R1 144.
63. Public Authorities' Holdings in Company Capital,' 17 E.C. BuLL. No. 9, at 93
(1984).
64. Commission Decision No. 257/80/ECSC, OJ. L 228/14 (1981) (establishing
Community rules for aids to steel industry); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
TIES, ELEVENTH REPORT ON COMPEmTON PoucY 117, 1 187 (1982).
65. Council Directive No. 81/363, O.J. L 137/39 (1981).
66. Commission Decision No. 89/218/ECSC, OJ. L 86/76 (1989) (Italian govern-
ment aid to public steel sector).
67. E.g., Re Aid to Eni-Lanerossi: Italy v. Commission, Case C-303/88, [1991]
E.C.R. 1-1433, [1993] C.M.L.R. 1; Italy v. Commission, Case C-305/89, [1991] E.C.R. I-
1603 (Alfa Romeo); France v. Commission, Case C-301/87, [1991] E.C.R. 1-307 (Bous-
sac).
68. Commission Decision No. 84/496/EEC, O.J. L 276/34 (Meura); Commission
Decision No. 82/670/EEC, O.J. L 280/30 (1982) (Intermills); Commission Decision
No. 87/585/EEC, O.J. L 352/42 (1987) (Boussac); Commission Decision No. 89/661/
EEC, O.J. L 394/9 (1989) (Afi-Fiat); Commission Decision No. 85/53/EEC, O.J. L 59/
21 (1985) (Boch/Noviboch); Commission Decision No. 88/282/EEC, OJ. L No. 119/
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Then came a 1991 communication. 9 Its objective was still
transparency (requiring annual reports). It also systematized
the private investor principle as the test for identifying aid in
transactions between public authorities (in whatever form) and
their public enterprises.
In June 1993, the Court of Justice annulled the 1991 com-
munication because it had used the wrong legal basis to impose
the reporting obligation, not foreseen by the transparency direc-
tive. ° The sting, however, had left the debate on substance; no-
body seriously disputed the private investor principle and its ap-
plication. A new directive was quickly issued, modifying the
transparency directive71 and imposing a reporting obligation for
all financial transactions with public enterprises in the manufac-
turing sector with a turnover of more than 250 million ECU. A
new communication was also issued, 2 the substance of which
was unchanged, except for the removal of the reporting obliga-
tion that had been transferred to the directive. DG IV now has a
task force, which monitors the implementation and analysis of
the reports.
The same rules apply in the service sector. There is no re-
porting obligation at present, because it is necessary to prioritize
limited resources. Some time is also needed to deal with techni-
cal difficulties in the service sector, such as the particular rela-
tionships between the Member State and the banking sector and
public service utilities. Nevertheless, cases in this area are more
and more frequent and action will soon be necessary to increase
transparency and monitor developments.
New guidelines on restructuring and rescue aid were
adopted on July 27, 1994. They codify and consolidate years of
case practice. In aid cases, a restructuring plan is needed that
charts a path to viability and reduction of capacity if the sector is
38 (1988) (Pinault-Isoroy); Commission Decision No. 88/454/EEC, OJ. L 220/30
(1988) (Renault).
69. Commission Communication, OJ. C 273/2 (1991) (to Member States on ap-
plication of Articles 92 and 93 of EEC Treaty and of Article 5 of Commission Directive
80/723 to Public Undertakings in Manufacturing Sector), annulled in part by France v.
Commission, Case C-325/91, slip op. at 6 (Eur. Ct.J.June 16, 1993) (not yet reported);
see Commission Directive No. 93/84/EEC, OJ. L 254/16 (1993); Commission Commu-
nication, 0.J. C 307/3 (1993).
70. France v. Commission, slip op. at 6.
71. Commission Directive 93/84/EEC, OJ. L 254/16 (1993).
72. Commission Communication, OJ. C 307/3 (1993).
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suffering from structural overcapacity; the aid must be limited to
what is strictly necessary. There must be a counterpart (con-
trepartie) showing what the aided firm is doing to improve the
structure of the market on which it operates. If the market con-
cerned has structural, as opposed to cyclical, excess capacity, the
aided firm must help by cutting its own capacity. If there is no
such excess capacity, must the aided firm still do something to
diminish the competitive disadvantages at which the aid places
its competitors by limiting its production or cutting its capacity?
In the Author's view, state aid policy is, more than other
branches of competition policy, about fairness as well as eco-
nomic efficiency. Firms that receive aid to help them restructure
and stay in business must sacrifice some of their productive ca-
pacity for the benefit of their competitors who are denied the
chance to gain from the disappearance of the firm that would
have failed without state aid.
III. THE FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF
STATE AlD POLICY
Rules to control state aids are becoming a more and more
essential element not only at the "intra-Union-level," but also at
an international level. In some ways, the logic of the internal
market can be easily transposed to international trade. As trade
becomes more liberalized at the world level, companies will feel
the effects of aids granted to their competitors in other countries
more keenly, and the distortions of competition that can result
from the granting of aid will become more serious.
This is why the Community, in its international agreements
with its partner countries, emphasizes provisions and mecha-
nisms to provide for the effective control of state aids. The two
most recent examples are the Agreement on the European Eco-
nomic Area:' and the Europe Agreements, concluded with the
Central and East European Countries. 4
A. The Agreement on the European Economic Area
The Agreement on the European Economic Area ("EEA
73. Agreement on the European Economic Area, O.J. L 1/3 (1994) [hereinafter
EEA].
74. See, e.g., Europe Agreement with Hungary, O.J. L 347/275 (1993).
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Agreement"), which entered into force on January 1, 1994,1s is
based to a large extent on rules of European Community law
adapted to the EEA context. It provides that the "four free-
doms" as foreseen under Community law (free movement of
goods, persons, services, and capital) apply, with some excep-
tions, such as agriculture, between the Community and the
other EEA States (i.e., Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and
Sweden), including not only the basic Community Treaty provi-
sions but also secondary Community legislation such as direc-
tives, regulations, and decisions. The same applies to a number
of other Community policies in which EEA partner states partici-
pate, including competition and state aid control.
The main substantive state aid rules are set out in Articles 61
to 64 of the EEA Agreement. These provisions are a copy of the
relevant Articles of the EC Treaty. Annex XV to the EEA Agree-
ment contains a list of all the state aid acquis communautaire that
must be used when interpreting Article 61 of the EEA.76 It is
therefore fair to say that the whole Community acquis corn-
munautaire has been extended to cover the whole European Eco-
nomic Area; 7 special provisions update the relevant provisions
in the EEA Agreement in line with newly adopted Community
acts, so as to ensure legal homogeneity in the future. In ajoint
declaration of the Contracting Parties, the EC and participating
European Free Trade Area ("EFTA") states declare that aid
granted through EC structural funds and all other financial in-
struments shall be in keeping with Article 61 of the EEA.78 Reg-
ular exchanges of information and views shall take place about
this aid. This declaration facilitates a coherent approach to state
75. EEA, supra note 73, O.J. L. 1/3 (1994); see, e.g., SVEN NORBERG E' AL., THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA, EEA LAW, A COMMENTARY ON THE EEA AGREEMENT (1993);
TH RtsE BLANCHET ET AL, THE AGREEMENT ON THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA (1994).
As of January 1, 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweeden will join the European Commu-
nity. Hugh Carnegy, Sweden Gives Clear Yes to EU: Vote in Favour of Membership Keeps
Enlargement Timetable on Course, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1994, at 1.
76. EEA, supra note 73, annex XV, OJ. L 1/3, at 457 (1994); see id. art. 61, OJ. L
1/3, at 17 (1994).
77. See Claude Rouam, LEspace tconomique Auropen, un Horizon Nouveau Pour la
Politique de Concurrence? 1992 CHRONIQUE Du DRorr DE LA CONCORRENCE 53; Thinam
Jakob-Siebert, Wettbewerbspolitik im Euorpischen Wirtschaftsraum (EWiqR), 1992 WIRTSCRAFTr
utrd W-rraTwERa 387.
78. EEA, supra note 73, Joint Declaration on Aid Granted Through the EC Struc-
tural Funds or Other Financial Instruments, O.J. L 1/3, at 538 (1994).
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and EC aids: EC structural funds and other financial instru-
ments have to be in conformity with Article 61.
Rules, however, are not enough. They must be enforced.
The EEA Agreement created the EFTA Surveillance Authority 9
("Authority"), an independent institution with powers mirroring
those of the Commission. Our procedures are followed by this
Authority, and it has been busy all year with state aid and other
work. The Authority has received more than 400 notifications
already.
The EEA Agreement provides for close cooperation be-
tween the Commission and the EFTA Surveillance Authority in
order to ensure the uniform implementation of the state aid
rules throughout the EEA's seventeen countries.8 0 This coopera-
tion, which gives DG IV a great deal of extra work, is based on
regular exchanges of information on general policy issues, as
well as on individual state aid programs and cases.
The EEA regime is an ambitious international initiative in
the state aid field. It demonstrates the Community's conviction
that market liberalization must go hand in hand with effective
scrutiny of governmental action that may distort competition.
The Agreement has worked very well, and relations between the
EFTA Surveillance Authority and the Commission have been ex-
cellent.
B. Agreements with the Central and East European Countries
In comparison with the EEA, the Europe Agreements81 con-
cluded on a bilateral basis with the Central and East European
Countries ("CEEC") provide for a lesser degree of market inte-
gration. Consequently, the system set up in those agreements to
ensure the control of state aid is less elaborate than that pro-
vided for in the EEA. Because the Europe Agreements were con-
cluded on a bilateral basis between the Community and the indi-
vidual countries concerned, it was not possible at the time of
conclusion to foresee the creation of a "supranational" authority
common to those countries, similar to the EFTA Surveillance
79. Id. art. 108, OJ. L 1/3, at 26 (1994); see id. Protocol 26, OJ. L 1/1, at 193
(1994) (defining powers and functions of EFTA Surveillance Authority in field of state
aid).
80. Id. art. 62(2), O.J. L 1/3, at 18 (1994); see id. Protocol 27, O.J. L 1/3, at 193-94
(1994) (establishing rules for cooperation).
81. E.g., Europe Agreement with Hungary, O.J. L. 347/275 (1993).
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Authority. All the agreements contain provisions stating that
state aids that restrict competition and affect trade between Con-
tracting Parties are incompatible with the functioning of those
agreements. Furthermore, it has been agreed that these provi-
sions must be interpreted in accordance with Article 92 of the
EC Treaty, that all the countries benefit from the derogation set
forth in Article 92(3) (a) of the EC Treaty for a (renewable) pe-
riod of five years, and that implementing rules must be drawn up
between the parties to ensure effective enforcement of the state
aid provisions2 This demonstrates the Commission's continued
emphasis on effective enforcement.
Discussions on these implementing rules is currently at an
early stage, but it is clear that effective state aid control will be
closely linked to the question of trade measures (if there is a
viable competition system including proper state aid control,
there may be no more need for trade measures). This has been
set out in the Commission's Communication to the Council on a
pre-accession strategy for the CEEC.83 One of the major
problems in this area will be transparency. The CEEC will have
to provide for mechanisms allowing for a close monitoring of
aids granted. This will be one of the CEEC's and the Commu-
nity's main challenges for the future. Effective state aid control
is in the interest of the CEEC themselves, whether or not the aid
affects trade between the country concerned and the Commu-
nity. It is only when that trade is- affected that there is reason for
the Community to become legally involved.84
When comparing the Commission's proposal for the struc-
ture of state aid monitoring for the CEEC with the GATT ar-
rangement of the Subsidy Code, the former is preferable be-
82. See, e.g., COMMISSION OF THE EuROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIIIRD REPORT ON
COMPETITION PoucY 11 101 et seq. (forthcoming 1994).
83. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Com-
mission to the Council, The Europe Agreements and Beyond: A Strategy to Prepare the
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Accession, COM (94) 320 (July 1994);
Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to
the Council, Follow-up to Commission Communication on "The Europe Agreements
and Beyond: A Strategy to Prepare the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for
Accession," COM (94) 361 (July 1994).
84. For recent developments, see Claude Roume et al., La Politique de la Concurrence
de la Communaut d lEchelle Mondiale: LExportation des dgles de Concurrence Com-
munautaires, 1 EC COMPETION POL'Y NEwsL. 7 (1994); Pierre Delsaux et al., Aspects
Internationaux de la Politique de Ia Concurrence, 1 EC CoMPETITIoN POL'Y NEWSL. 57
(1994).
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cause it offers an a priori approach to the problem. The CEEC
structure is preventive, whereas the GATT arrangement deals
with damage repair or remedies. The CEEC arrangements allow
for smoother intervention and cause less disruption, and are
more transparent and economically efficient, both internally for
the countries involved and in terms of international trade rela-
tions.
In concluding the EEA Agreement and the Agreements
with the CEEC, the Community has taken a decisive step for-
ward. It has changed its approach from one of adopting defen-
sive trade measures a posteriori to one of trying to prevent such
measures by relying a priori on a viable competition policy sys-
tem. Where markets are open, market access is not hampered
by state regulation, and a viable system of state aid control is
established, there will be less need to resort to traditional trade
measures, such as antidumping or countervailing duties. The
economic basis for such measures will have been eliminated, or
at least considerably reduced. Thus, in the EEA, antidumping
duties have been abolished. The Community approach there-
fore sends a positive signal to international trade and its policy-
makers. At the same time, by providing for more transparent
rules, it will enhance legal certainty for industry. State aid issues
are inextricably bound up with international trade liberalization.
IV. PROCEDURES
A. The European Court ofjustice, the Court of First Instance, and
Third Party Rights
In recent years, there has been a marked increase in the
number of actions brought under Article 173 of the EC Treaty85
against Commission state aid decisions. From third parties who
took part in the Commission's procedure 6 to those who com-
plained that there was no procedure to take part in,8 7 the Euro-
pean courts have been willing to hear actions against state aid
decisions. The new jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance in
85. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 173 (governing competency of parties to bring
actions before Court ofJustice reviewing legality of Council or Commission acts "other
than recommendations or opinions").
86. Compagnie Francaise de l'Azote (Cofaz) SA. v. Commission, Case 169/84,
[1986] E.C.R. 391, 415, 1 25, [1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 385, 411.
87. Cook v. Commission, Case C-198/91, [1993] E.C.RL 1-2487, [1993] 3 C.M.L.Rt
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state aid matters will not arrest the growth of state aid proce-
dures.
State aid procedures are conducted largely between the
Commission and the Member State concerned. Strictly speak-
ing, therefore, the would-be recipient of aid is also a third party.
This Article shall concentrate on the procedural rights of the
beneficiary's competitors.
In cases where the Commission has initiated the procedure
provided for in Article 93(2), a complainant who responds to
the invitation to comment, and whose position on the market is
significantly affected by the measure concerned, may seek judi-
cial review of a Commission decision.88 But what if the Commis-
sion does not initiate the procedure, or considers that a measure
is not state aid requiring notification?
Here the situation is similar to that prevailing under Regula-
tion 4064/89 (merger regulation),89 where the Commission
does not receive a notification or issues a decision under Article
6(1) (a)9" that a notified concentration does not fall within the
scope of the regulation.91 In the state aid field, a Commission
decision that a measure: (i) is not state aid within the meaning
of Article 92(1); (ii) is state aid, but does not affect trade be-
tween Member States; or (iii) is state aid, but is found to be com-
patible with the common market without any initiation of the
Article 93(2) procedure, may be brought before the Court of
First Instance by a competitor of the recipient, or before the
Court of Justice by a Member State.
How does a competitor know what is going on? Discussions
about whether a given measure should be notified take place
between the Commission and the Member State concerned.
Letters sent to a Member State stating that no notification is re-
quired are not published. Decisions that state aid is compatible
with the common market without initiation of procedure are
summarized in brief statements in the Official Journal. It has
been suggested recently that the Commission should publish a
88. Opinion of Advocate General van Themaat, Cofaz, [1986] E.C.R. at 407, [1986]
C.M.L.R. at 405.
89. Corrigendum to Council Regulation No. 4064/89, O.J. L. 257/13 (1990).
90. Council Regulation No. 4064/89, art. 6(1)(a), O.J. L 257/14, at 19 (1990).
91. See Air France v. Commission, Case T-3/93, [1994] E.C.R. 11-121 (discussing
such issues in full).
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register of all aid measures notified to it.12 This raises questions
of confidentiality and international relations. Why should Mem-
ber States be required to announce information they may wish
to withhold, and why should the Community as a whole give pos-
sible ammunition to its trading partners in international trading
disputes, where those trading partners are under no similar obli-
gation to publicize subsidies? In any case, unnotified measures
that a competitor may wish to characterize as aid would remain
undisclosed even if a register of notifications were made public.
Suspicious competitors should watch market developments
carefully and not hesitate to ask the Commission whether aid has
been paid, notified, or approved in a given case. Competitors
will find the Court of First Instance receptive to actions for an-
nulment of Commission decisions that aid is compatible with the
common market or that a measure is not state aid.9" It has been
pointed out that the ease of access to the Community's courts is,
in a way, compensation for the lack of procedural rights for third
parties before the Commission in state aid cases prior to or in
the absence of an initiation of procedure.94 This compensation
may be unsatisfactory for third parties faced with the opacity of
relations between the Commission and the Member State con-
cerned. The Commission's commitment to openness, trans-
parency, and proximity to the citizen would suggest that greater
efforts should be made to render the system of enforcement of
the state aid rules more accessible to interested parties. While it
remains true that the Treaty creates a set of obligations and pro-
cedures, whose main actors are the Commission and the Mem-
ber States, the purpose of that system is to ensure that aid does
not unduly favor certain undertakings or the production of cer-
tain goods (Article 92(1)), in pursuit of the overall aim of a sys-
92. CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRY, CONTROLUNG STATE AIDS: MAKING THE
SINcLE M"= WORK (1994); see BuNDESVND DER DEUTSCHEN INDUSTRIE, EU-
BEIHILFENPOLTnc: DIE TATBESTANDSMEREMALE DES ARTIKELS 92 ABSA= 1 EG-VERTRAG
(1994).
93. See Cook v. Commission, Case C-198/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-2487, [1993] 3
C.M.LR 206; Air France v. Commission, Case T-3/93, [1994] E.C.R. 11-121. The anal-
ogy between the merger regulation and state aid procedure is striking, and was specifi-
cally drawn by the Court of First Instance in its reference to Cook in Air France. Air
France, [1994] E.C.R. at 11-162, 1 81.
94. Luc Gyselen, La Transparence en Matire d'Aides dttat: Les Droit des Ties, 1993
CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPPEN 417.
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tern of undistorted competition (Article 3(g)). 9 5 It is therefore
important to ensure that third parties are given enough informa-
* tion to assert their rights.
The Commission will publish a Guide to Procedures setting
out the manner in which state aid cases are dealt. The develop-
ing case law of the Court of First Instance is likely to prove influ-
ential in protecting the interests of third parties. Perhaps in the
future, a procedural regulation will be enacted pursuant to Arti-
cle 94.96 Until legislation or case law alters the balance of the
system, it must be understood that the state aid rules are ad-
dressed to Member States with third parties playing a limited
role in their application. For the time being, therefore, one
must beware analogies with the competition law enforcement
system developed under Regulation 1717 and other procedural
rules for the application of Articles 85 and 86.98
B. Article 94
It is well known that the Commission is reluctant to propose
Council legislation under Article 94. It is perhaps less well
known that, with occasional exceptions, there is little call from
the Member States for such proposals, possibly because there is
no consensus among them on a state aid policy different from
the one developed by the Commission. In the absence of such
legislation, a number of interesting legal issues arise.
The only provision of the state aid rules under the EC
Treaty that is directly effective in the courts of the Member
States is the last sentence of Article 93(3):
The Commission shall be informed, in sufficient time to en-
able to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid.
95. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 3(g). "[T]he activities of the Community shall
include ... a system of ensuring that competition in the internal market is not dis-
torted." Id.
96. See Snyder, Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European Community
(1993) (EUI Working Paper LAW No. 93/5, European University Institute, Florence)
(discussing role of "soft" law in development of state aid law and policy).
97. Council Regulation No. 17/62, 13 J.O. 204 (1962), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-
1962, at 87.
98. EC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 85-86 (competition rules). Article 85 of the
Treaty prohibits actions that cause "the prevention, restriction or distortion of competi-
tion within the common market." Id. art. 85. Article 86 prohibits such acts as limiting
production to influence the market for a good, unfair pricing practices, and unfair
trading practices. Id. art. 86.
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If it considers that any such plan is not compatible with the
common market having regard to Article 92, it shall without
delay initiate the procedure provided for in paragraph 2. The
Member State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect
until this procedure has resulted in a final decision.99
The national court will have to consider whether the "pro-
posed measures" constitute state aid within the meaning of Arti-
cle 92 (1)100 before reaching a decision under the last sentence
of Article 93(3). The Commission's decisions and the case law
of the Court of Justice devote considerable attention to this im-
portant question. In particular, the national court must inter-
pret the notion of state aid widely to encompass not only subsi-
dies, but also tax concessions and investments from public funds
made in circumstances in which a private investor would have
withheld support.1 1 The aid must come from the "state," which
includes all levels, manifestations, and emanations of public au-
thority.112 The aid must favor certain undertakings or the pro-
duction of certain goods. This serves to distinguish state aid to
which Article 92(1) applies from general measures to which it
does not. 0 3
Is the national court also empowered to consider the other
conditions of Article 92(1), or must it stop at the characteriza-
tion of the measure as state aid? This controversial question is of
99. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 93(3) (emphasis added). "Existing" aid, however,
may be implemented until the Commission has decided that is it incompatible with the
common market. See Banco de Cr~dito Industrial, now Banco Exterior de Espafia v.
Ayuntamiento de Valencia, Case C-387/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-877; Namur - Les Assurances
du Credit v. Office National du Ducroire and Belgium, Case C-44/93 (Eur. Ct.J. Aug. 9,
1994) (not yet reported).
100. See Steinike und Weinlig v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case 78/76, [1977]
E.C.R. 595, 610, 1 14, [1977] 2 C.M.L.R. 688, 722. In Steinike, the Court stated that "a
national court may have cause to interpret and apply the concept of aid contained in
Article 92 in order to determine whether State aid introduced without observance of
the preliminary examination procedure provided for in Article 93(3) ought to have
been subject to this procedure." Id.
101. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Spain v. Commission, Joined Cases
C-278-80/92, 1 28 (Court decision not yet reported) ("State aid is granted whenever a
Member State makes available to an undertaking funds which in the normal course of
events would not be provided by a private investor applying normal commercial criteria
and disregarding other considerations of a social, political or philanthropic nature.").
102. See Re Regional Aid Plans: Federal Republic of Germany v. Commission, Case
248/84, [1987] E.C.R. 4013, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 591; Van der Kooy v. Commission,
Joined Cases 67-68, 70/85, [1988] E.C.R. 219, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 804.
103. Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, Sloman Neptun, Joined Cases C-72-
73/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-887 (stating distinction clearly).
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great importance.
10 4
If the measures concerned are state aid and the Commis-
sion has not yet adopted a final decision concerning them, the
state aids may not be implemented and certain important conse-
quences would follow. Implementation would be illegal. Only
the Commission can decide that state aid is "incompatible with
the common market,"10 i.e., not authorized and therefore pro-
hibited. The Court of Justice has set out a clear distinction be-
tween the role of the Commission and that of the national
courts. 0 6
As with Article 85(1) and (2), Article 86, and block exemp-
tion regulations, national courts may refer preliminary questions
to the Court ofJustice pursuant to Article 177 of the EC Treaty,
and indeed must do so in certain circumstances.10 7 They may
also request assistance from the Commission by asking it for
104. See Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Namur - Les Assurances du Credit v.
Office National du Ducroire and Belgium, Case C-44/93 (Eur. Ct. J. Aug. 9, 1994)
(Court decision not yet reported) (stating clearly that notification requirement extends
to all state aid measures).
105. EC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 92-93.
106. FRd~ration Nationale du Commerce Extrieur des Produits Alimentaires v.
France, Case C-354/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5505, 1-5527, 11 9-11. In Fdiration National,
the Court held:
As far as the role of the Commission is concerned, the Court pointed out
in itsjudgment in Case 78/96, Steinike und Weinlig v. Germany, [1977] ECR 595,
at paragraph 9, that the intention of the Treaty, in providing through Article
93 for aid to be kept under constant review and supervised by the Commis-
sion, is that the finding that aid may be incompatible with the common mar-
ket is to be arrived at, subject to review by the Court, by means of an appropri-
ate procedure which it is the Commission's responsibility to set in motion.
As far as the role of national courts is concerned, the Court held in the
same judgment that proceedings may be commenced before national courts
requiring those to courts to interpret and apply the concept of aid contained
in Article 92 in order to determine whether State aid introduced without ob-
servance of the preliminary examination procedure provided for in Article
93(3) ought to have been subject to this procedure.
The involvement of national courts is the result of the direct effect which
the last sentence of Article 93(3) of the Treaty has been held to have. In this
respect, the Court stated in its judgment in Case 120/73, Lorenz v. Germany,
[1973] ECR 1471, that the immediate enforceability of the prohibition on im-
plementation referred to in that article extends to all aid which has been im-
plemented without being notified and, in the event of notification, operates
during the preliminary period, and if the Commission sets in motion the con-
tentious procedure, until the final decision.
Id.
107. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 177 (jurisdiction of Court of Justice in prelimi-
nary rulings).
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"legal or economic information" by analogy to the Court's De-
limitis'0 s judgment on Article 85.
The national judge's duty is to ensure that no effect is given
to the proposed aid measure until the Commission has reached
a final decision on its compatibility with the common market.
The judge must, at the request of a party or ex officio, use all
appropriate devices and remedies and apply all relevant provi-
sions of national law to implement the direct effect of this obli-
gation placed by the Treaty on Member States. 09 Any deficiency
of these national rules, which denies the full effectiveness of Arti-
cle 93(3), must be set aside as a matter of Community law. The
judge should, as appropriate, grant interim relief, order the
freezing or return of monies illegally paid, and award damages
to parties whose interests are harmed. The order should be
made against the Member State, or whatever public authority
was responsible for the measure concerned.
The Community law rules in Francovich"0 and Factortame"'
should be applied in state aid cases before national courts. Indi-
viduals and undertakings must have access to all procedural
rules and remedies provided for by national law on the same
conditions as would apply if a comparable breach of national law
(for illegal payment/receipt of public funds) were involved.
This equality of treatment concerns not only the definitive find-
ing of a breach of directly effective Community law, but also ex-
108. Delimitis v. Henninger Br~u A.G., Case C-234/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-935, [1992]
5 C.M.L.R. 210; see Commission Notice, OJ. C 39/6 (1993) (cooperation between na-
tional courts and Commission in applying Articles 85 and 86 of EEC Treaty). The Com-
mission is preparing a notice on cooperation between itself and national courts in the
state aid field. Advocate General Lenz has drawn a parallel between the Delimitis case
and the state aid field in his Opinion in Namur, 106.
109. Federation Nationale, [1991] E.C.R. at 5528, 1 12. The Court in Federation Na-
tionale held that:
[T]he validity of measures giving effect to aid is affected if national authorities
act in breach of the last sentence of Article 93(3) of the Treaty. National
courts must offer to individuals in a position to rely on such breach the certain
prospect that all the necessary inferences will be drawn, in accordance with
their national law, as regards the validity of measures giving effect to the aid,
the recovery of financial support granted in disregard of that provision and
possible interim measures.
Id.
110. Francovich v. Italy, Joined Cases C-6, 9/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5357, [1993] 2
C.M.L.R. 66.
111. The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd.,
Case C-213/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-2433, [1990] 3 C.M.LR. 1, [1990] 2 CEC (CCH) 189.
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tends to all legal means capable of contributing to effective legal
protection. Consequently, national courts must be able to take
provisional steps to suspend measures contrary to Community
law and to award compensation for the damage suffered as a re-
sult of such measures. If adequate remedies are not available in
national law and the effectiveness of Community rules is im-
paired, national courts must set aside impediments in national
law and apply general principles of Community law.
In this way, national courts ensure that the competition
rules are respected for the benefit of individuals. This is particu-
larly important for the period of time between the grant of aid
and the Commission's final decision. Although no new aid mea-
sure may be put into effect before the Commission has reached a
final decision, the Commission, unlike a national court, cannot
oblige a Member State to pay damages for any loss caused by an
aid measure.
CONCLUSION
The founding generation of the European Community has
achieved a great deal in creating a comprehensive system of state
aid control from nothing. The challenges now are the interface
between private and public sectors in the single market, the
globalization of the economy, and the transformation of an ad-
ministrative procedure between civil servants into a system of
economic law enforcement.
